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aircraft manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing, rely on their 
single aisle, shorter range products as consistent revenue 
streams. The Airbus A320 first flew in 1987 and the Boe-
ing 737 first flew in 1967 (Norris 2014). To reduce risk, 
these companies have adopted an iterative development 
approach to their products as opposed to regular new prod-
uct introduction. This approach has been vindicated by the 
record sales achieved by the latest iteration of the Airbus 
A320, known as NEO (Airbus.com 2014). With an exten-
sive order book secured, the company has now shifted its 
focus onto cost reduction to maximise profits and to accom-
modate rises in other costs, such as inflation. One area that 
has been targeted is manufacturing and assembly. Manu-
facturing systems in long life products are at risk of being 
superseded by competitors if they are not addressed regu-
larly. Technology insertion is typically the first approach to 
manufacturing system optimisation (Arc Advisory Group 
2011), but there comes a point when the product also 
requires optimisation for manufacturability. Identifying 
where design for manufacture and assembly optimisation 
projects can occur on a product that has been in produc-
tion for decades is a difficult task. Most design for assem-
bly methods is optimised for new product introduction of 
small volume assemblies. This paper presents a redesign 
for assembly toolset that includes novel factors, such as 
obsolescence impact and operation difficulty. The aim of 
the tool is to give the engineer a process comparison mech-
anism that enables the identification of projects related to 
redesign for assembly that are potentially profitable.
2  Literature review
Design for assembly and manufacture (DFMA) is a method 
that has been widely adopted in the development of new 
Abstract Design for assembly is the concept of carry-
ing out critical thought early in the design stage to create 
assembly easement at the production stage. In the aero-
space industry, products have very long lives, frequently 
being optimised rather than introducing new products. This 
has meant older products, which are stable income genera-
tors, have not benefited from the latest design for assembly 
methods and manufacturing technology suffers from obso-
lescence. It has been established that a large percentage of 
overall product cost is determined at the design stage; thus, 
existing products suffer from preloaded costs. This paper 
takes existing design for assembly methodologies and anal-
yses them with respect to the unique challenges involved 
in legacy product redesign. Several novel factors that con-
tribute to redesign analysis are identified such obsolescence 
impact and a holistic operation difficulty assessment. A tool 
is developed to identify potential redesign for assembly 
projects. The tool is demonstrated through the application 
of real data and comparing against business decisions. The 
tool was found to provide a strong indication of where prof-
itable projects may be launched.
Keywords Design for assembly · Redesign for assembly · 
Aerospace assembly
1 Introduction
The aircraft industry produces long life products that stay 
in production for decades. The two dominant commercial 
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products. The terms “Design for Manufacture” mean 
the design for ease of manufacture of the collection of 
parts that will form the product after assembly. The terms 
“Design for Assembly” mean the design of the product for 
ease of assembly (Boothroyd et al. 2014). Before the adop-
tion of DFMA, design engineers would typically work 
independently of manufacturing and assembly engineers. 
Boothroyd et al. (2014) state that over 70% of product cost 
is assigned at the development stage. Indeed, the objective 
of DFMA is to reduce cost in the overall life of a product. 
There are a number of approaches in the literature on how 
this can be achieved. Most notably, Boothroyd et al. (2014) 
were a pioneer in formalising such an approach. They pro-
vide three criteria upon which each part must be examined. 
They are as follows:
1. During the operation of the product, does the part 
move relative to all other parts?
2. Must the part be of a different material than or isolated 
from all other parts already assembled?
3. Must the part be separated from all other parts already 
assembled because otherwise necessary assembly or 
disassembly of other separate parts would be impossi-
ble?
The application of this approach is demonstrated exten-
sively by Boothroyd et  al. (2014). However, the applica-
tions are all of small volume parts with tolerances that are 
more relaxed than those required in the aerospace industry. 
In addition, the Boothroyd method is focused on part count 
reduction. Frey et al. (2007) carry out an in depth analysis 
on the effect of part count reduction in increasing product 
robustness. As part of this analysis, they state that although 
part count reduction can lead to a reduction in cost; in 
high value components, it can also lead to an increase in 
cost. The examples presented by Boothroyd are of rela-
tively low value assemblies and reducing part count usu-
ally involves transferring part functionality into other com-
ponents making their manufacture slightly more complex. 
If this approach was implemented on aircraft components, 
then this would likely result in unmanageable escalating 
costs. In a redesign scenario, reducing part count is even 
more difficult. In the case of legacy aircraft, the infrastruc-
ture involved in manufacturing the components would also 
need to be updated. Suppliers of complex machined com-
ponents would be required to increase their capability to 
accommodate additional functionality of components. Fix-
tures and assembly technology would also need upgrading. 
In this light, part count reduction is only part of a strategy 
to reduce assembly costs in redesign of aircraft assemblies.
Another approach to Design for Manufacture and 
Assembly is that of Miyakawa and Shigemara (1986). They 
developed the Hitachi Assemblability Evaluation Method 
(AEM); a tool that feeds into design to improve produc-
ibility of the product. It consists of two steps: the first is 
to assign quantitative data to existing assembly processes 
and the second is to sum these values to create an AEM 
score. This is then used to assess time and cost. Ohashi 
et  al. (2002) further expanded on this method by intro-
ducing part-based cost estimation. Similar to this is the 
Lucas method, developed by Sealy and Corns (1992). They 
assigned ratings to the following:
•	 Functional analysis: interrogation of every component 
as to its function within the product;
•	 Handling analysis: examination of the ability to handle 
and position each part to achieve the correct assembly 
orientation;
•	 Fitting analysis: assessment of ease of holding an 
assembly.
In a redesign context, it is difficult to make accurate 
estimates of cost impact due to the associated impact on 
delivery disruption, supplier capability development, and 
in house infrastructure development. In addition, at rede-
sign stage, the selection of processes and technology has 
already taken place and decisions on technology and pro-
cess selection will also include the cost of replacing infra-
structure against the cost of keeping functional existing 
infrastructure.
Hsu and Lin (2002) also produced a quantitative method. 
This method was designed to assess component accessi-
bility during assembly. They argue that accessibility is an 
indicator of the probability of successfully achieving design 
targets within manufacturing capability. This method relies 
on the availability of 3D CAD models to carry out assess-
ments. In the case of legacy aircraft, the assemblies being 
considered for redesign are several decades old, devel-
oped before the widespread application of 3D modelling. 
Furthermore, the accessibility being discussed is access to 
the part, or difficulty in placing components into the part. 
Accessibility in aircraft assembly is different; the chal-
lenges are those of line of sight and ergonomics due to the 
size of the assembly.
Whitney (1988), in the Harvard Business Review, com-
ments on DFA in the context of manufacturing by design. 
He says that value engineering and design for producibility 
are the real objectives when embarking on a DFA journey. 
He says that DFA cannot achieve fundamental improve-
ments, because it considers the product as a collection of 
parts instead of something to satisfy larger goals such as 
reducing costs over the life time of the product. This further 
emphasise the point made about part count reduction in air-
craft assembly.
There is little specific literature carried out on redesign 
for assembly. Fabricius (1994) asserts that the traditional 
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method for assembly improvement is through technology 
insertion. This eventually reaches a saturation point due 
to inflexibility and high capital costs. He proposes a seven 
step procedure for design for manufacture. Although he 
asserts his method is suitable for redesign, his procedure 
is more in line with initial development of products then 
redesign. It starts with the production of conceptual ideas 
that are refined at every step. This cannot be implemented 
in a redesign scenario.
Desa (1987) acknowledges the importance of redesign. 
He developed a tool set and interface module that relies 
on historical knowledge of the original design for input 
into redesign. He states that the following aspects are 
critical when carrying out redesign:
•	 good performance measures;
•	 good understanding of the effect of design modifica-
tions on these performance measures;
•	 procedures that utilise the first two points.
Desa’s focus, much like Boothroyd, is on small assem-
blies evidenced by his frequent reference of a small elec-
tromechanical assembly. Furthermore, Desa presents no 
real case studies, merely a theoretical demonstration. In 
addition, he does not refer to the nuances in deciding 
which redesign projects to go forward with. An aircraft 
assembly will have many areas that may benefit from 
redesign, but not all can be achieved; the selection of 
which project to target is a difficult task.
Lee et al. (1993) proposes using the traditional DFMA 
with some modifications for redesign situations. The two 
modifications he proposes are the inclusion of analysis 
of assembly sequence as part of redesign DFA method-
ology and also the consideration of design rationale in 
the same process. He developed what he called the Back-
ward Assembly Planner (BAP) to identify assembly prob-
lems and REVerse ENGineering (REVENGE) toolset 
to come up with assembly solutions. He argues that his 
methodology leads to a more realistic DFA outcome as 
the activity of assembly planning is coupled tightly with 
redesign. Hsu et  al. (1993) also proposed a method that 
uses assembly planning as an input. In long life products, 
extensive consistent assembly planning and optimisation 
already takes place. It is an easy target for optimisation as 
heavy investment is not usually required.
Lefever and Wood (1996) states that part count reduc-
tion is the most effective Redesign DFA target. As men-
tioned previously, although this may be affective in some 
cases, directing redesign efforts towards one aspect is 
not an efficient method of addressing assembly issues. A 
more comprehensive analysis of the product and manu-
facturing system in place is more efficient.
All of those methods fail to address a critical aspect of 
aircraft production. This is that the products themselves are 
of long life. There is no account of obsolescence of tech-
nology and processes in the analysis. In addition, there is 
no method to holistically assess assembly process difficulty. 
Usually, one aspect of process difficulty is addressed, such 
as accessibility or handling.
In a report written by Peter Reynolds for the Arc Advi-
sory Group (2011), who are a global market research advi-
sory group, it is stated that there is an estimated $65 billion 
of obsolete automation technology within the manufactur-
ing industry. Obsolescence in manufacturing, especially 
in aircraft manufacturing, takes a different definition than 
is typical. Sandborn (2007) defines obsolescence as “the 
loss or impending loss of original manufacturers of items 
or suppliers of items or raw materials”. Suppliers to air-
craft manufacturers are unlikely to discontinue a prod-
uct or service to aircraft manufacturers as this will cutoff 
a potentially long lasting revenue stream. However, this 
does not stop the technology industry itself from develop-
ing superseding technologies or processes. Obsolescence in 
this case is that a competitor gains an advantage by deploy-
ing the latest technology and processes. Indeed, this kind 
of obsolescence can exist in the same company, where a 
more recent product employs more efficient transferable 
processes.
3  Redesign scenario
This particular research is focused on the assembly of a 
wing box structure. The wing is part of the shorter range 
aircraft family and is approximately 15  m in length. As 
mentioned previously, this family of aircraft has been in 
production for several decades. Company policy through-
out the life of the aircraft has been to introduce design 
changes to the product to improve product performance. 
This policy has been justified with the volume of sales gen-
erated in recent years.
As for optimising manufacturing and assembly, small-
to-medium-scale technology insertion has been the typical 
solution for enhancing the production system. Changes in 
design to create manufacturing easement have been difficult 
to achieve due to the challenge in demonstrating an attrac-
tive business case. The high cost of carrying out design 
changes and the potential for recertification costs is prohib-
itive. In addition, the reward for decreasing manufacturing 
costs is typically not comparable to the reward from sales 
and performance savings achieved through performance 
modifications. The success of the single aisle aircraft mar-
ket is also a factor as competitors adopt a risk averse atti-
tude so as not to compromise delivery of aircraft and thus 
lose market share.
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As mentioned before, in more recent years, sales of these 
aircraft have been numerous and decreasing delivery lead 
time has become a more prominent issue. Therefore, manu-
facturing and assembly system improvements are being 
demanded by the business and the introduction of design 
changes for assembly easement is viewed more favourably. 
Continuous product development teams are now encour-
aged to pursue them.
As discussed, DFA methodology is not entirely suited 
for this particular context. DFA methodology has tradition-
ally focused on new products that are small in volume. The 
challenges in this scenario are summarised as follows:
•	 large volume components;
•	 high tolerance assembly criteria (positional accuracies 
of holes at 0.2 mm);
•	 long life products;
•	 high capital monument technology and tooling already 
in place;
•	 uncompromising delivery targets;
•	 knowledge disconnect.
3.1  Large volume components
Components require specialised tooling for lifting and 
handling. Accessibility is also an issue due to the compo-
nents limited line of site. Operators are sometimes work-
ing on assemblies without having visual sight to all areas 
being affected. There are also times when the operator has 
to work inside closed boxes and cramped spaces. These 
aspects do not form part of the critical thinking in small 
volume assemblies.
3.2  High tolerance assembly criteria
Due to the large safety requirement for aircraft, assembly 
tolerances are high. Coupled with the large volume of air-
craft, this makes the costs of associated assembly technol-
ogy high. This aspect is one of the advantages that can be 
gained through careful redesign analysis.
3.3  Long life products
This is the largest factor in creating assembly issues when 
competing against rivals. Although the processes that are 
in place are functional, in many instances, there are likely 
to be superior options available. For example, new aircraft 
programs, such as the Airbus A350 and the Boeing 787, are 
likely to have developed new assembly processes that may 
be backward compatible. Similarly, the technology used 
during assembly has likely been superseded throughout the 
years.
3.4  High capital monument technologies
Expensive bespoke technology has already been invested 
in, such as high accuracy fixtures and bespoke monument 
automation. In addition, problematic is that datum struc-
tures for legacy products typically reference high accuracy 
fixtures.
3.5  Uncompromising delivery targets
There is a cultural reluctance to introduce any changes 
that may put the production system at risk of not meeting 
its immediate delivery targets. With performance improve-
ments, this risk is offset by the estimated revenue genera-
tion. In the realm of production system improvement, as 
mentioned before, redesign for assembly, up until very 
recently, had been considered a major risk. Even technol-
ogy insertion, which has been the predominant method of 
improving the production system, is carried out in a man-
ner, where only small-scale step changes are introduced. 
Further to this, the introduction of new technology or pro-
cesses would entail training and ramp up costs and delays 
that would be viewed unfavourably.
3.6  Knowledge disconnect
Another interesting element contributing to a lack of rede-
sign for assembly activity is knowledge on where to carry 
out projects. As mentioned, the business is interested in 
exploiting any opportunity to increase production rates 
and reduce costs. When continuous improvement teams 
attempt to identify areas or projects that would benefit 
from a redesign analysis, they rely on information from 
production teams. This researcher carried an investigation 
with members from different production teams. They were 
asked what changes to the product could yield an assembly 
improvement. Most suggestions were minor changes that 
would yield small savings that although not insignificant 
and would not justify the cost of design changes.
Thus, it becomes apparent that a method for identifying 
where redesign activities is needed on legacy products and 
production systems would be of benefit.
4  Redesign methodology
The method is required to carry out aspects of traditional 
DFMA methods but also account for its application on 
existing production systems. The method is designed to 
streamline the project selection process and is listed as 
follows:
1. data acquisition;
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2. analysis;
3. idea generation;
4. selection and approval;
5. implementation.
The methodology follows a linear flow. Structured data 
gathering are the first step, followed by knowledge genera-
tion that leads to solution generation and implementation. 
The first two stages of the flow are the creation of knowl-
edge. After knowledge is generated, solution generation 
becomes the target. The aim of this method is not to gen-
erate solutions, rather the aim is to highlight where rede-
sign for assembly projects may be profitable. Corbett and 
Crookall (1986) highlight that rigid solution engineering 
techniques are not the most effective way of producing 
engineering results. Rather, engineers should be allowed 
to apply their own ingenuity and creativity in finding solu-
tions. This is the approach adopted by this methodology.
Whilst engineers should perhaps typically be left to cre-
ate solutions through uncontrolled innovation, the selection 
and approval process inherently plays a critical part in the 
project progression. Frustratingly, it is not always the opti-
mal solutions that are selected for implementation due to 
circumstantial prohibitors, such as simultaneous projects, 
company direction, or even negative company politics.
The methodology is summarised in Fig. 1.
The first phase of this Methodology is the identification 
and collection of data and the creation of a data pool. These 
critical performance criteria are made up of two categories. 
The first category is measureable criteria related to tradi-
tional DFA. The second category is factors that are unique 
to products that already in production.
Once a pool of data is created, the next step is data min-
ing. In any given investigation, certain criteria will take 
precedence depending on the objective of the study. For 
example, if reducing assembly time is a current objective, 
then indicators that provide information on time and effi-
ciency will take precedence. At this stage, the most relevant 
performance criteria are selected to act as a data filter. Once 
this takes place, effective data can be drawn from the previ-
ously assembled data pool. This methodology is unique in 
that it considers manufacturing enablement through design 
after a product is in steady-state production. The methodol-
ogy takes into account both traditional design for assem-
bly techniques as well as specific factors related to redesign 
for assembly. As mentioned previously, traditional DFMA 
techniques tend towards initial development of products 
through concurrent consideration of design, manufacture, 
and assembly. Redesign for assembly aims to do this whilst 
also acknowledging the restrictions that a steady-state 
product has to navigate through and also the advantages in 
available data that a live product provides.
Analysis of this filtered data leads to the creation of 
recorded tacit knowledge. This is defined by Groff and 
Jones (2003) as personal knowledge embedded in indi-
vidual experience. It involves intangible factors, such as 
Fig. 1  Redesign for assembly 
method
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opinions, perspective, and values. This type of knowledge 
is more difficult to record and transfer.
The creation of knowledge in turn leads to the project 
selection stage. Depending on a company’s current strat-
egy, projects will be selected according to the most valua-
ble criteria at that time. After project selection, the projects 
are taken into development stage, named the Solution Engi-
neering phase. As discussed, solution engineering is not the 
goal of this method, but it needs to be acknowledged. It is 
intended that the analysis phases, specifically the obsoles-
cence analysis, will provide a strong indication of a poten-
tial project direction.
5  Tool creation
From the previously discussed methodology, the most criti-
cal aspect is the section, where data are drawn through the 
performance criteria. Therefore, the development of a tool 
to implement the stated methodology in that area is pro-
posed. The tool will provide quantitative results to compare 
processes against each other. Therefore, the first task in put-
ting together such a tool is to identify measurable factors 
that can provide data.
Four groups were approached separately in pursuit of 
this criteria as well as also asking them about their thoughts 
on potential DFA projects in the hope that some consistent 
parallels could be drawn from each group. The four groups 
were as follows:
•	 Operations and manufacturing engineers: these are 
directly involved in manufacturing improvement pro-
jects and day-to-day running of production;
•	 Industrial architects: this is a body that attempts to link 
manufacturing improvement with engineering improve-
ment;
•	 Engineering continuous improvement: these are engi-
neers that typically work on performance improvement 
for the aircraft;
•	 Research and technology: this is a team that develops 
assembly and manufacturing technology and processes.
These are all separate roles and members of each func-
tion do not assume responsibilities of other functions.
Four main aspects emerge from Table  1. These are as 
follows:
•	 failure analysis;
•	 cost;
•	 operation difficulty;
•	 market changes and obsolescence.
5.1  Failure analysis
Failure is anything during manufacture phase that contrib-
utes to further unplanned costs. Through this investigation, 
it was observed that failures that affect the performance of 
the product are most critical, and thus, they are taken most 
seriously. As such these failures go through analysis to 
eliminate recurrence or solutions are engineered in advance 
to address them before they occur. However, as per the 
definition stated previously, these are not all failures that 
are interesting to this investigation. This tool will attempt 
to capture those failures through engaging with the spe-
cific operators and manufacturing engineers that work in 
that process. The most direct way of capturing this data is 
through disruption time. However, this is not easily acces-
sible as disruption time is classified into several catego-
ries and those categories are presented as time figures that 
capture other areas of disruption. Therefore, failure will be 
captured in the operation difficulty assessment as a ques-
tion that is answered through feedback from the operators. 
This is shown in Table 4.
5.2  Cost
In any manufacturing business, operations are mapped out 
in great detail with time allocations identified. There are 
Table 1  Showing the stakeholders engaged to define performance criteria
Group Feedback
Operations and manufacturing engineers Cost and failure are the main drivers to target. Suggested projects were small-scale projects that would 
not payback after a design change. An example was certain features being too close to a work area 
prohibiting the use of a faster tool
Industrial architect Cost, failure and also performance improvement were projects that the Industrial architect is interested 
in
Engineering continuous improvement Aircraft performance improvement were key for any project in this team, some isolation from manu-
facturing was prevalent with manufacturing projects only considered as part of larger engineering 
improvement projects
Research and technology Technology obsolescence and recurring cost improvement were the main drivers behind projects in 
the Research team
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three main inputs that can provide useful data for this anal-
ysis. They are as follows:
•	 Work content tracker: captures operation order and flow 
as well as the number of operators assigned to work on 
particular tasks;
•	 Standard time intervals, man hours, and number of 
operators: captures all time-related aspects of an opera-
tion;
•	 Critical path: captures the operations that lie on the crit-
ical path of production.
Cost carries the heaviest weighted factor that will feed 
into this model. Depending on the scenario that the pro-
gram is operating in different weight allocations will be 
given to hours that can potentially be saved. If, for exam-
ple, the company has an overall drive to reduce the total 
number of man hours during wing assembly, then any hour 
that can be saved becomes critical. If, however, the com-
pany is looking to increase production rates, then special 
emphasise will be placed on hours that lie on the critical 
path. Three measurable will be used to compare the impact 
of cost on different processes. They are:
•	 overall number of hours allocated to the completion of 
a process;
•	 critical path time;
•	 number of operators involved in a single assembly pro-
cess.
5.3  Operation difficulty
The following methodologies have been developed in the 
past with a view to operation difficulty:
•	 handling score (Hitachi Assemblability Method);
•	 number of parts and nature of activity (Boothroyd and 
Dewhurst);
•	 assembly plan evaluation (Hsu);
•	 accessibility (Hsu and Lin).
A method to determine a quantitative number that can 
provide an indicator to operation difficulty using an adap-
tation of these methodologies is required. The proposed 
method is developed specifically for wing box assembly 
in a large commercial aircraft manufacturer. In order for 
it to be used in any alternative capacity, the questions that 
are asked will need to be tailored for that assembly envi-
ronment. The main assembly activities are categorised 
and analysed in terms of complexity. The main operations 
that wing box assembly consists of can be categorised as 
follows:
•	 clamping;
•	 drilling;
•	 sealing;
•	 bolting;
•	 cleaning;
•	 measuring/checking.
The way the analysis has been set up is that each oper-
ation is raised and the complexity of the operation is 
assessed based on a series of questions. Each set of ques-
tions provide a number that are summed together. A higher 
number indicate a higher operational complexity or diffi-
culty. As well as these operation specific questions a num-
ber of overall operation questions. These questions take 
into account the total number of components involved in 
the activity and the total number of operations. This tool 
also assesses the level of value being added by the opera-
tion. For example, a measurement operation or a cleaning 
operation is essential but could be better served with an 
embedded solution or a more efficient process in the case 
of cleaning. The more variety involved in a process, the 
higher the operation difficulty number will be. The meas-
urables that are collected from this aspect are as follows:
•	 Operation Difficulty Score;
•	 number of components;
•	 number of process actions.
5.4  Market changes and obsolescence
This appears to be the main contributing factor for a steady-
state production system. The amount of saving or cost 
opportunities that are not exploited due to obsolescence is 
immeasurable.
Obsolescence in this context is process obsolescence. As 
mentioned previously, suppliers are unlikely to stop provid-
ing a product or service required by a large OEM, this is 
especially true in a long life product, such as an aircraft. 
This does not mean that they will cease to develop better 
products. The moment a competitor takes advantage of a 
manufacturing technology that is superior to the one cur-
rently employed that technology begins to become obso-
lete. The extent of that obsolescence depends on the level 
of advantage provided. This at first seems like technology 
insertion with no place in a DFA analysis. However, these 
researchers have encountered multiple instances, where an 
available technology that can provide significant improve-
ment to assembly is discarded, because the current product 
design is not able to accommodate that technology. This is 
one aspect of obsolescence.
The second aspect of obsolescence is a knowledge 
management recirculation issue. It would be prudent for 
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manufacturers to superimpose their new processes on their 
older products.
In this analysis, it is difficult to record these data quanti-
tatively. The researcher proposes a gated classification pro-
cess to categorise the level of obsolescence of the process 
under analysis. The following defined Obsolescence Impact 
(OBI) Factors are proposed:
It should be noted that the improvement, mentioned in 
Table  2, is defined as whether the process or technology 
has been superseded elsewhere to mature level.
It is important to note that the quality of the benchmark-
ing exercise is critical in determining an accurate OBI 
score.
5.5  Redesign for assembly tool
With these criteria in mind the tool is demonstrated in the 
following. The proposed tool was applied to the scenario 
of the installation of brackets that are bolted onto the struc-
tural stiffeners of an aircraft wing skin and to the wing ribs. 
Due to the confined nature of where they are installed, the 
use of the latest drilling machines is unavailable. The val-
ues shown are not real values for confidentiality reasons. 
However, the conclusions drawn are based on the real val-
ues and are still valid.
6  Case study
6.1  Setting the problem
To test the methodology being proposed in this work, a 
case study with a known outcome is used. The case study 
looks at the installation of a large number of butterfly 
brackets, known as cleats. The problem has been persis-
tent despite several attempts to find solutions through 
technology. Recently, a proposal to design out these but-
terfly brackets has been accepted and when completed 
will offer considerable assembly savings. As this case 
has a known redesign for assembly outcome, it provides 
an ideal case study to measure the effectiveness of the 
Table 2  Obsolescence Impact Score criteria
OBI 1
 Process or technology is State of the Art and is being utilised efficiently
 There are no updated techniques for this process and no visible opportunities for improvement
OBI 2
 The technology or process is still current and serves its purpose well however there are potential improvements being developed
 There are immature technologies being developed but their capability is unknown
OBI 3
 Immature technologies or processes have been developed outside of the business but it is unknown how effective they will be
 The process or technology is still functional and is not considered a risk in the immediate future
OBI 4
 Technology is out dated and whilst it functions correctly there are mature off the shelf solutions that can improve the process
 Processes have been superseded outside of the business but have not been demonstrated specifically in the targeted business area
 Processes have not been superseded inside of the business
 If this process is not addressed it will become a bottleneck in the future
OBI 5
 The process or technology is out of date
 The process is a bottle neck in the manufacturing assembly line
 Mature processes have been developed and implemented to address this area in other parts of the business
 Mature technologies are currently being used by competitors for this process or a process very similar to it
Fig. 2  Showing Butterfly brackets bolted onto wing ribs
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tool. The location of these cleats is shown in Fig. 2, and 
an example of a cleat is shown in Fig. 3.
The wing box is assembled in a section during pro-
duction labelled Stage01. This is consistent for the Sin-
gle Aisle, Long Range and A380 aircraft. In general, the 
majority of required holes are now drilled using a semi-
automated drilling process using a drilling unit called an 
automated drilling unit (ADU). This process involves the 
use of thick templates that act as fixtures for the drill-
ing unit to drill a hole with a countersink in one single 
operation. Previously, to drill a hole to the required tol-
erances, a multi-step progressive drilling method was 
used that involved the following steps:
•	 pilot hole;
•	 first size;
•	 down size;
•	 reaming;
•	 countersink cage.
With the introduction of automated drilling units 
(ADU), cycle time has been reduced dramatically by 
removing several drilling passes. These ADU are used 
to carry out the majority of drilling operations on areas 
that have large collections of holes.
There are some areas that did not benefit from the 
deployment of ADUs. One such area is cleat installa-
tion. Cleats are butterfly brackets that are bolted onto 
the structural stringers on the wing skin and to the wing 
ribs. These brackets offer extra support, strengthening 
the interface between the Wing Skin and the Ribs. Due 
to the confined nature of where they are installed, the 
use of current ADU is unavailable. Therefore, the pro-
cess of drilling these butterfly brackets has remained as 
before.
6.1.1  Cleat drilling process
The cleat installation process is listed as follows:
 1. collect equipment;
 2. ensure work area is clean and clear;
 3. check and mark edge distances as per drawing;
 4. clamp cleat to stringer;
 5. pilot forward rib hole and pin;
 6. pilot stringer hole and pin;
 7. pilot remaining holes and pin stringer hole;
 8. open aft rib hole to requirement and check;
 9. open stringer hole to requirement and check;
 10. repeat for remaining holes;
 11. remove cleat (unpin rib last);
 12. de-burr;
 13. remove swarf.
The process is complex, and the working conditions are 
confined. Pilot holes are drilled on the cleats during their 
manufacture. These holes are then transferred to the adja-
cent structure after locating and clamping individual cleats 
in position. As well as the many steps involved in drilling 
each hole of each cleat, there are a variety of cleats differ-
ing by shape, dimensions, and hole locations. Therefore, as 
well as the many drilling steps for each hole in each cleat, 
the hole positions vary on the cleats themselves. This adds 
an extra step on each drilling operation for measurement. 
In one particular aircraft, there are 123 cleat variations. 
In total, there are 150 cleats which are installed. Many of 
these cleats are similar in shape but have slight differences 
in dimensions. Many times dimensions vary from one cleat 
to the next by 0.1 or 0.2 mm. The most commonly occur-
ring cleat shape is the butterfly shape, as shown in Fig. 4. 
In this shape alone, there are 42 different variations.
The number of variations in cleats is an example of the 
pre-DFMA culture during product development. Design 
engineers were following strict design rules driven by 
weight reduction targets. From the design engineers’ point 
of view, standardising the cleat shape would serve no 
purpose as at that time, every cleat would still need to be 
measured and installed. For the manufacturing engineer, 
the variation in cleat shapes and dimensions creates two 
problems. The first is that simplifying this task becomes 
very difficult if a solution is sought through technology 
insertion. Typically, implementing an automated or tooling 
solution requires a stable process with minimal variation 
lest the costs escalate and become unfeasible. The second 
is that this manual, variable task creates an environment, 
where errors are more likely to occur.
Due to the reasons mentioned, technology solutions 
would be very costly in this area, and thus, an alternative 
solution would be beneficial. The proposed tool is thus 
Fig. 3  Showing a cleat bracket
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used to demonstrate that a DFA solution is a more interest-
ing prospect (Fig. 5).
6.2  Tool demonstration
6.2.1  Cycle time and cost
The cycle time and cost for this area are summarised as fol-
lows: five operators are required for a shift of 8 h to com-
plete the full set (Table 3).
6.2.2  Failures
As mentioned previously, recorded data for failures is not 
captured in a method that can be used in this kind of analy-
sis. The proposed method is to capture feedback from the 
operations teams for the individual work packages. The 
input into the proposed tool will be a positive or nega-
tive response. Failures and rework will appear as a single 
numeric in this tool; either they will be listed as an issue or 
they will not.
6.2.3  Operation Difficulty Score
The operation difficulty score is calculated using a set of 
questions displayed in Table  4. It should be noted that 
the series of questions are unique to this manufacturing 
Fig. 4  Showing a typical but-
terfly cleat
Fig. 5  Visual demonstration of where cleats appear in a wing box
Table 3  Real values not shown
Drilling of brackets Per wing set Per 
single 
wing
Overall operation man hours 60 30
Critical path (h) 10 5
Number of operators 12 6
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system. A unique set of questions to achieve a opera-
tion difficulty score is required to be developed for every 
unique manufacturing system. For example, the ques-
tions shown in Table  4 are only applicable to the wing 
box assembly area. They are not applicable to the next 
stage of wing production; system installation.
There are two notable numerical values that are 
gained in the analysis shown. They are the operation dif-
ficulty score and the number of operations. The opera-
tion difficulty score sums together the number of dif-
ferent types of operations, for example, if the operation 
involves a drilling, bolting, and sealing activity, these 
will sum together as 3. The operation difficulty score 
also takes into account the difficulty of those activities. 
For every further complication, an extra 1 is added to 
the operation difficulty score. For example, if a drilling 
operation is a single pass, this will merely count as one. 
However, if the drilling activity requires several passes, 
along with changes in tooling or cutter size, then this is a 
further complication and thus will be counted as 2.
The second significant numeric that appears in Table 4 
is the number of actions that take place in the operation. 
This is a count of the number of actions that the operator 
is required to carry out to complete the package of work. 
For example, one drill cycle would count as one action. 
If, to complete a hole, several drill cycles are required, 
this would count as several actions. Together with the 
operation difficulty score, these two factors provide a top 
level and superficial view of the operation difficulty that 
can be used to make quick assessments.
6.3  Obsolescence
As discussed previously, the obsolescence analysis is dif-
ficult to quantify. The author has proposed an obsolescence 
impact score that requires the user to make a judgement 
based on gathered data. The two streams of data that are 
required to be collected are “changes to the process or part 
that are present in more recent products” and a technologi-
cal assessment of what is available throughout the industry. 
The first set of data is easier to acquire and is definitive. 
The second set of data requires an engineer with experience 
in the particular field of technology to carry out a small 
benchmarking analysis. The risk here is overlooking tech-
nology or not having exposure to a particular technology. 
The impact score is assigned from 1 to 5. An impact score 
of 1 means that the current process is not obsolete and an 
impact score of 5 indicates that there is room for possible 
improvement.
In this case, the score provided is 4 due to the acknowl-
edgement that it falls under the OBI characterisation from 
Table 2 of “if this process is not addressed it will become 
a bottleneck in the future”. A benchmarking exercise 
on potential technology was carried out, and despite the 
Table 5  Obsolescence Impact score
Internal factors
Long range aircraft have standardised cleats
New stress and structural analysis methods open the possibility for cleat 
deletion
New technology developments Maturity Comments
Confined space robot: snake arm robot Low Prohibitive price and lack 
of effective payload 
capability
Advances in drilling capability Low
Obsolescence impact rating
1–5
1—little to no impact
5—process or technology are highly outdated
Assessment 4
Table 6  Showing the various design for assembly factors proposed 
in the methodology (no values shown)
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passage of several decades, since this process was intro-
duced, a cost effective technology is still not available.
The main reason the obsolescence impact score in 
Table 5 is high because of the development of new stress 
and structural analysis methods. These have enabled stud-
ies to take place that have allowed an aircraft in a different 
program to benefit from cleat standardisation. In addition, 
these methods have enabled an analysis that has indicated 
that cleat deletion is now also a possibility.
6.4  Cleat analysis section
Table  6 shows the results that would be generated by the 
proposed tool and methodology. The problem with any 
acquired data is that there is nothing to compare it against, 
and therefore, they are currently meaningless. In order for 
the tool and methodology to be effective, more data are 
required to create comparison scenarios.
One problem is the identification of which operations 
to analyse. The detailed analysis carried out for the cleat 
drilling operations will take a very long time to be carried 
out on every operation in wing box assembly. A shorter 
approach is, therefore, required to identify which opera-
tions should be analysed to this level of data. As discussed 
previously, the biggest driver in manufacturing and assem-
bly improvement has always been the number of hours 
saved. A more recent driver that provides more direction is 
a reduction in the critical path. As such, the author has pro-
posed the use of a two tiered approach. The first filter will 
organise operations based on the number of hours that lie 
on the critical path of wing box assembly. The second filter 
will organise the operations based on the total number of 
hours involved.
7  Results and discussion
In order for the tool to provide meaning, it must be used 
in context. This requires data population of a number of 
other processes to compare against. The tool was used on 
six different processes. These processes were identified for 
analysis through a combination of recommendations from 
industrial and programme teams and some analysis of the 
assembly critical path to identify time consuming areas. 
The areas processed are as follows:
•	 top skin front spar drilling;
•	 bottom skin panel loading;
•	 cleat installation;
•	 pylon machining;
•	 rib installation;
•	 top skin panel reloading.
7.1  Analysis
Figure  6 shows a radar chart comparing the processes 
against each other. For the purposes of the chart, a normali-
sation process was carried out to plot the different factors 
on the same axis. Cleat installation is displayed in the anal-
ysis as a measure of the control. It is shown to score highly 
in a number of areas compared to the other processes dis-
played. This is a positive indicator as to the reliability of 
the tool as cleat installation is a process that has already 
been chosen for redesign by the business. The indicators 
explained in Sect. 11 can be split into two categories. The 
first are typical DFMA indicators and they are as follows:
•	 number of components;
•	 overall operation man hours;
•	 critical path time;
•	 ratio of operators to actions.
The second category are those indicators that relate 
directly to redesign for assembly of a product already in 
steady-state production. These are as follows:
•	 failure score;
•	 Operation Difficulty score;
•	 Obsolescence Impact score.
Each process displayed in the radar chart shown in Fig. 6 
is thus analysed based on these categories.
7.2  Top skin front spar drilling
This is the drilling process through the top skin and into the 
front spar. It involves the use of drilling templates and the 
progressive installation of temporary fasteners. The tradi-
tional DFMA indicators appear to illustrate that there is no 
need for redesign. However, the process is shown to have 
a high operation difficult score and a high OBI score. The 
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Fig. 6  Showing the analysed processes compared against each other
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operation difficulty score is high due to the requirement for 
specific tooling for back drilling to produce datum holes. 
This stems from the size of the panel components. As to 
the high OBI score, this is allocated for two separate rea-
sons. The first is that geometric dimensioning and toleranc-
ing methods (GD&T) have evolved in the past few decades 
and have even been implemented on newer programs. They 
have not been implemented on this legacy product and 
thus this datuming issue is present. In addition, the datum 
holes are required to be drilled in large flat areas that have 
no nearby features that can be datumed from. Thus, opera-
tors are required to datum from the other side of the panel, 
where there are ribs and other features to datum from.
The other contributing factor to the OBI score is that 
the technology used to carry out this process has been 
superseded. This process is now fully automated on newer 
aircraft.
7.3  Bottom skin panel loading
This is the initial loading and wrapping of the bottom skin 
panels on to the ribs. The actual loading of the wing skins 
was found to be a relatively short process despite requir-
ing highly skilled operators. The time consuming elements 
were in preparing the skins for loading.
This process was highlighted by stakeholders within 
the production organisation as an area for improvement. 
However, the OBI score it received is relatively low. This 
researcher investigated the disparity between the perceived 
problems of this process and its reality. The perception by 
the production teams was that there was a high failure rate 
due to the forces involved in wrapping the panels around 
the rest of the assembly and a perception that this induced 
necessary repositioning of the panel further along the 
assembly. This researched carried out a detailed study in 
this area in an attempt to identify DFA improvements. It 
was found that the assembly process itself was not prob-
lematic and that the process was not found to be obsolete. 
However, the compliant nature of the component, meant 
that movement during assembly was inevitable. An inves-
tigation into better forming processes was also launched. 
However, even with a more robust forming process, the size 
and nature of the component meant that this would have 
limited effect at this assembly stage.
This is a positive result for the tool as the tool indicated 
that limited improvement could be offered in this area.
7.4  Cleat installation
This process has been discussed previously in this report. 
The process is already currently being addressed as it has 
been identified as a problem area. It is shown here to act as 
a measure of the success of the tool.
7.5  Pylon machining
The pylon machining being addressed here is the drill-
ing of a support plate in the pylon area. This process is 
shown to have a high critical path time. This is due to a 
number of factors related to the components themselves. 
The material in the pylon area is titanium, and as such, it 
is difficult to machine. In addition, locating parts around 
it and using fasteners to secure its location are more chal-
lenging due to the material being less compliant then alu-
minium. At the time that this was designed and launched 
into production, the processes that were implemented 
were the most efficient. However, as shown by a high 
OBI score, there are technologies available now that can 
offer a more efficient method of assembly. In addition, 
advances in GD&T ability have revealed that the toler-
ance requirement for this area does not need to be as tight 
as is specified. At pylon machining phase, the tolerance 
allowance allocated to the components is exceeded by 
the machining technology. This is due to an increase in 
the capability of the machining technology over the last 
few decades. Thus, if the tolerance at machining phase 
is made tighter, the tolerance at assembly phase can be 
relaxed achieving the same total tolerance allowance.
The operation difficulty score is also high. This stems 
from the fact that the uncompliant material is difficult to 
locate into position and this leads to operators having to 
adjust the assembly when parts move out of position.
A traditional DFA analysis will have indicated that this 
area was indeed difficult but that it was necessary and there 
was no need to change anything. The redesign indicators 
inform the engineer that there is potential for improvement.
7.6  Rib installation
This is the process of assembling the ribs to the front and 
rear spars. Traditional DFA indicators point to a reassess-
ment of the area as it is a process that lies directly on the 
critical path and also has a high number of components. 
However, a traditional DFA assessment would also indicate 
that the parts are necessary and that they are required to be 
separate components. The redesign indicators tell a differ-
ent story. A high operation difficulty score and a high OBI 
score point towards an opportunity in this process. The high 
OBI score is due to the same process being upgraded on a 
newer aircraft program through a modern GD&T analysis. 
The new process involves a determinant assembly approach 
and is a more cost effective way of installing the ribs. The 
introduction of such a process would also reduce the opera-
tion difficulty score. This is because when the main reasons 
that this was high were because of the difficulty in locating 
the ribs and adjusting their position.
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7.7  Top skin panel reloading
This operation involves relocating the top skin. The top 
skin is removed from the assembly after it has been drilled 
in order for cleaning and deburring to take place. It is 
then relocated onto the structure using the same original 
method of location. This operation is similar to the pro-
cess of bottom skin panel loading discussed previously and 
shares many of the same challenges. The reason it was also 
included in this assessment was due to a recommendation 
by the production teams. The reasoning was that this was a 
more challenging process then the initial loading onto the 
wing box assembly as the holes that have been drilled are 
now required to line up. This is represented by a slightly 
higher operation difficulty score as readjustment of the 
assembly was occasionally required. However, as with the 
bottom skin loading, the operators carrying out this process 
are highly skilled and are usually able to locate the skin 
panel efficiently. An over reliance on those operators may 
perhaps create a bottleneck if they are needed elsewhere 
but this offset by the cost of developing a technological 
solution.
8  Summary and recommendations
Acknowledgement has been added that the general method-
ology is a general methodology and can be applied in any 
redesign scenario; however, the tool for every manufactur-
ing system requires unique development.
The tool demonstrated positive initial success. The tool 
was able to highlight that the cleat installation process was 
indeed problematic and that it suffered from obsolescence. 
This corresponded to the business decision to carry out a 
redesign in that area. In addition, the tool pointed towards 
two more areas that could benefit from redesign for assem-
bly projects. These two projects were also highlighted by 
the factory as potentially profitable. The other areas that 
were analysed were not deemed profitable, and this was the 
same view of the factory. The one area of discrepancy was 
the loading of the wing skins. The plant decided to further 
investigate the form of the wing skins throughout produc-
tion. However, this proved to be evidence in favour of the 
methodology and the tool as after the investigation was car-
ried out, no obvious benefit could be identified.
The redesign indicators were able to highlight processes 
for project consideration, where traditional DFA analysis 
could not. Obsolescence analysis and operation difficulty 
assessment were shown to be useful tools for analysis in 
established production systems.
A deficiency in the tool is that the tool only studies pro-
cesses in isolation. A process is very likely to be affected by 
previous processes on the same assemblies or components. 
This was demonstrated through the investigation into the 
assembly of panels where a better understanding of the area 
could only be achieved through a root cause analysis of the 
component from its machining phase to its assembly phase. 
Future development of the tool will attempt to factor in 
component and time-related elements.
It is important to acknowledge that the tool is specific 
to this scenario. The methodology, demonstrated in Fig. 1, 
is a general methodology that can be applied for any rede-
sign scenario. However, every manufacturing system will 
require the development of its own tailored tool. Even if 
this methodology was to be used for another stage of pro-
duction of the same wing box, the tool would require adap-
tation to that requirement.
It is typically assumed that critical path is the most 
prominent factor in making decisions with regard to man-
ufacturing and this is why it is included as a part of this 
analysis. However, in a redesign setting, there are a num-
ber of factors that might be prioritised at a particular time. 
For example, if delivery dates have been established, then 
reducing total operation hours is perhaps more profitable 
for that product than a reduction in critical path. This tool 
enables the engineer to decide on which project to analyse 
based on the current factors that a product is being sub-
jected to.
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